Modeling administrative corruption in the model of combining general and private interests, taking into account the costs of agency control

Abstract

Modeling administrative corruption in the model of combining general and private interests, taking into account the costs of agency control

Tkachenko N.V., Gorbaneva O.I.

Incoming article date: 04.05.2021

The article is devoted to the study of administrative corruption in the model of combining general and private interests, taking into account the costs of controlling agents. As the subject of research, we considered mathematical models of a combination of general and private interests of a hierarchical structure such as "Principal-Agent" and "Supervisor-Agent". The administrative control mechanism was investigated for the case where the principal sets a lower constraint.

Keywords: models of the combination of general and private interests, corruption, resource allocation, hierarchical systems, management systems, the Germeier-Vatel idea, private and common interests, principal, agent, center, administrative mechanism